|
Guam 1941 & 1944: Loss and Reconquest (Campaign) |  | Author: Gordon Rottman
Creator: Howard Gerrard
Publisher: Osprey Publishing
Category: Book
List Price: $19.95
Buy New: $11.96
as of 9/6/2010 17:39 MDT details
You Save: $7.99 (40%)
New (21) Used (11) from $7.60
Seller: allnewbooks
Rating:  4 reviews
Sales Rank: 442802
Media: Paperback
Pages: 96
Number Of Items: 1
Shipping Weight (lbs): 0.7
Dimensions (in): 9.7 x 7 x 0.4
ISBN: 1841768111
Dewey Decimal Number: 940.5426
EAN: 9781841768113
ASIN: 1841768111
Publication Date: July 25, 2004
Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days
| |
| Similar Items:
| |
| Editorial Reviews:
Product Description
The island of Guam was the first Allied territory lost to the Japanese onslaught in 1941. On 10 December 5,000 Japanese troops landed on Guam, defended by less than 500 US and Guamanian troops, the outcome was beyond doubt. On 21 July 1944 America returned. In a risky operation, the two US landing forces came ashore seven miles apart and it was a week before the beachheads linked up. Only the battles for Iwo Jima and Okinawa would cost the Americans more men than the landings on Guam and Saipan, which immediately preceded the Guam operation. In this book Gordon Rottman details the bitter 26-day struggle for this key Pacific island.
|
| Customer Reviews:
 Guam 1941 & 1944 Loss and Reconquest (campaign) May 13, 2010
William W. Gaffin (Wayne, IL United States)
Very factual and detailed account of the battles and personnel who participated in them great battle maps and photographs, the illustrations were very unique
For the price I was expecting more of a read (it's only 91 pages)
I wanted the facts about Guam and this book did a good job fullfilling that need
Good Coverage of the Liberation of Guam August 6, 2009
Dave Schranck (Anaheim Ca)
1 out of 1 found this review helpful
Mr Rottman has specialized in Pacific Island campaigns in WWII and this is another fine effort. The introductions to these campaigns are always good, giving the reader as much background information as the Osprey publisher will allow. The history of the island goes back over 200 years and the author gives some of that history but quickly zooms up to the 20th century when the US acquired the island from the Spanish in 1899. On Dec 10th, 1941 the Japanese invaded and captured the island, imprisoning the US garrison and enslaving the natives. The island is the largest in the chain and its terrain will afford the defenders certain minor advantages that were missing on Tinian.
The Chronology is very good and will help with the framing of the invasion events. The author allows four pages to explain the fall of the island in 1941 and its ample. Moving to 1944, the Opposing Plans and Opposing Forces sectons is very good while the Opposing Commanders is good but the author underplayed the friction in the American Command structure between Turner and Gieger and between LtGen Smith and MajGen Smith and the Marines and the Army.
The author devoted only 44 pages to the assault which was adequate for a 96 page book. Mr Rottman has a very concise style that allows good coverage of the battle action within these summaries. The assault was broken up in logical timeframes: W day, W+1 to W+8, W+9 to W+!7 and the last 4 days. For being a summary, not a full length book, the coverage was good, showing the marines and soldiers scratching out a beachhead and then seeing their momentum increase as the enemy is reduced from a number of banzai charges.
There were five 2-D maps and three 3-D maps. All the maps were good but couple could have been better. Troop dispositions on these 2-D maps were not always complete. The first 3-D map was the landing on the north shore which was adequate but the southern landing was only in 2-D. A 3-D map would have been nice and it could have been squeezed into the book. The second 3-D map was of Orote Peninsula and that was adequate but still fuller comments and better troop movement displays would have added to the reader's understanding. The last 3-D map was the Japanese counterattack of the north shore's 3rd MarDiv's beachhead sector. It was the best of the three, it shows the Japanese penetration in the Asen River region and on Bundschu Ridge.
There were also three 2-page battle scenes, typical of these books, which are interesting. In the Aftermath section, the author acknowledges that there were too many friendly fire casualties. The US had total 7,800 casualties on Guam as compared to over 11,000 on Saipan. These two engagements were the worse the US suffered up to that point. The Japanese lost close to 19,000.
If Mr Rottman has whetted your appetite for more about this campaign, let me suggest a very good book by Harry Gailey. Its called "The Liberation of Guam" and it will give greater details on the battle action, especially about the Japanese counterattack of July 25th. Also the attack on Fonte Ridge and the Orote airfield or the attack on Agana are given greater coverage. The Medal of Honor recipients are mentioned as well.
 good documentary account September 19, 2007
Harry S. Mustard (Hilton Head, SC)
2 out of 2 found this review helpful
As Mr Forczek (sp?) comments in his excellent, comprehensive review, this is a good factual, objective if dry account of the Guam Campaign and history prior to the invasion.
My father was with the 3d Marine Division (1/21) (Asst Bn Surgeon)in the invasion; he was later on Iwo. He says in his letters that the fighting was in some ways more fierce on Guam, maybe because he was on the receiving end of that counter-attack described by Rottman.
This book goes well with Alvin Josephy's book, "The Long and the Short and the Tall", and there is a Military Traditions video out done by the military describing the details of the fighting. Each of these gives a different dimension of the invasion. Josephy's book gives 1st hand account. I don't really understand why Guam is referred to as a "campaign" and not as an invasion as the others (Saipan, Iwo, Tarawa)were and has received relatively little attention.
Good Data, No First-Person Accounts September 5, 2004
R. A Forczyk (Laurel, MD USA)
14 out of 15 found this review helpful
The Japanese capture of Guam in December 1941 and the US reconquest of the island are covered by Gordon L Rottman in Osprey's Campaign #139. Although operations on this island in the Second World War normally do not rate much attention, Rottman notes that this was an expensive invasion by 1944 standards.
The standard section on opposing forces, plans and commanders are good, if dry. While Rottman notes that operationally the idea of landing two US Marine forces separated by 7 miles was unprecedented, he fails to note that the three major US units landing (3rd Marine Division, 1st Provisional Brigade and US Army 77th Infantry Division) had only a 2.6-1 numerical advantage over the defenders - a bit slim for an opposed landing. The author provides five 2-D maps (strategic situation; Marianas islands; Japanese defenses on Guam; the fight for the beachheads; daily progress, 21 July - 10 August 1944), three 3-D "Bird's Eye View" maps (3rd Marine Division securing the beachhead; the capture of Orote Peninsula and the Japanese counterattack on 25-26 July 1944) and three color battle scenes Banzai attack on the 3rd Marine Division hospital; trail-breaking in northern Guam; feeding the "Long Toms"). The maps were better in this volume than his previous volume on Saipan, particularly in filling in the strategic picture. On the other hand, the author notes that for coastal defense the Japanese had nineteen 8-inch guns and eight 6-inch guns, but doesn't identify where they were located in proximity to the invasion beaches. The author's order of battle is excellent - always as Rottman specialty - as is the bibliography.
Rottman describes the hopelessness of the small US Navy-US Marine Corps garrison in December 1941, which was quickly overwhelmed by the Japanese. The quick loss of the island at the outset of the war - and the fact that US military planners assumed that the island was indefensible - raises two questions not addressed by Rottman. First, why did the US garrison not have a better self-destruct plan to quickly dispose of aviation fuel stocks and vehicles to prevent falling into Japanese hands? Second, given the facts that the Guamian population was friendly and the island was fairly large and littered with caves, why did the US military not consider guerrilla warfare on Guam? Rottman notes the successful evasion for more than two years by US Navy signalman George Tweed, but what if the US Marine company on Guam had prepared arms caches and hide locations in the remote areas of the island before the Japanese invasion. Apparently, Guam is a pretty good place to hide, since Rottman notes that about "7,500 Japanese were still at-large on the island when it was declared secure" and the last holdout didn't surrender until 1973. Rather than meekly surrendering and heading off to Manchurian prisons, a small force of Marines and Guamians probably could have been more useful as a stay-behind force to assist the eventual reconquest of the island.
The strength of this volume -as all of Rottman's volumes - lies in the detail on daily military operations, but the weaknesses are lack of humanity and failure to analyze available data. Rottman fails to provide any first-person accounts or to even mention any of the four US Marine Medal of Honor recipients in the campaign Skaggs, Mason, Wilson and Witek). Even George Tweed's miraculous survival and escape rates only two sentences. Rottman suggest that US Marine battalions were gutted by heavy losses on Guam, at one point claiming that "most Marine battalions lost over 300 killed each, some almost 500." Rottman's casualty table shows 1,457 US Marine fatalities on Guam, which divided by the 15 Marine infantry battalions in the operation, yields an average of only 97 deaths per battalion (and this ignores artillery, engineers and support troop losses). If we consider total casualties, then it is possible that the rifle battalions suffered 300-400 casualties each, but we need to be careful with these numbers. Stastically, someone like John Kerry counted as three "wounded" in Vietnam, even though he was never hospitalized; on Guam, I'm sure some Marines were wounded more than once. The other issue where Rottman shows failure to analyze is to ask why the US Army, which had 35% of the combat troops on Guam, suffered only 10% of the deaths? Obviously, the Marine casualties appear pretty excessive in comparison to the US Army methods.
I also find Rottman's description of the Japanese counterattack on 25-26 July 1944 troubling. Coming less than three weeks after the destructive Japanese Banzai attack on Saipan, one might think that the 3rd Marine Division would have been expecting something similar on Guam. Instead, the 3rd Marine Division had all nine of its infantry battalions on line with no appreciable reserve and no defenses in depth; all of which greatly facilitated the Japanese counterattack. As on Saipan, the Japanese penetrated the thinly spread Marine perimeter and drove deep into the rear areas, inflicting serious casualties. While it is true that the Japanese attacks in both cases cost them the bulk of their assault force, it seems that a certain amount of luck saved the Marines from total disaster. I suspect that the Marine commanders were under pressure to expand the beachhead as rapidly as possible and this meant taking risks, such as no reserve. However, this was fairly foolish and callous toward the lives of their own men. Had the Marines had a smaller perimeter with a reserve, the Japanese would have been just as destroyed but with lighter US losses. My suspicion is that Rottman accepts the 1944-US Marine style of operations as the "right way" and insinuates that the more careful US Army tactics were "wimpy."
|
|
|
Legal and Privacy CERTAIN CONTENT THAT APPEARS ON THIS SITE COMES FROM AMAZON SERVICES LLC. THIS CONTENT IS PROVIDED ‘AS IS’ AND IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE OR REMOVAL AT ANY TIME. Powered by Associate-O-Matic
| |
